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IN DEFENSE OF POPULAR ELECTIONS 
Former Justice Robert L. Brown* 
Arkansas is in a crisis over how to select Justices of the Arkansas Su-
preme Court. Arkansas has had popular elections of its justices since 1864,1 
but the impact of money on judicial elections, and suspicions surrounding it, 
have now caused public confidence in the selection of our justices to dip to 
an all-time low.2 Reform, as a result, is very much in the air, and the prevail-
ing wisdom is that dramatic changes need to be made to the judicial selec-
tion process.3 This article will address the effectiveness and viability of the 
proposed reforms. 
I. POPULAR ELECTIONS 
Arkansas fell in step with the new wave of Jacksonian Democracy that 
swept many southern states following the Civil War and converted to the 
popular election of supreme court justices rather than appointments by either 
the general assembly or the governor.4 One reason was the widely-held sus-
picion that the appointment system was political, and it was thought that 
corruption could be avoided if the voting population as a whole selected the 
justices.5 
Popular elections have now been the process for more than 150 years.6 
This dovetailed well with the state’s motto, Regnat Populus, the People 
Rule, which was part of the Great Seal of the State when Arkansas entered 
 
*Robert L. Brown is a retired Associate Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court. He is a grad-
uate of the University of the South (B.A., 1963), Columbia University (M.A., 1965), and the 
University of Virginia (J.D., 1968). He currently is Of Counsel with the law firm of Friday, 
Eldredge & Clark. “I am indebted to my law clerk, Nicole C. Gillum, and to my administra-
tive assistant, Brenda Bennett, for their extensive research and help in the preparation of this 
essay.” 
 1. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. VII, § 7. 
 2. Jim Hannah, Chief Justice, Ark. Supreme Court, State of the Judiciary (June 13, 
2014) (transcript available at https://courts.arkansas.gov/sites/default/files/tree/2014%20State
%20of%20the%20Judiciary.pdf). 
 3. Max Brantley, Judicial Campaign Contributions and a Change to Appointment on 
the Legislature’s Agenda Soon, ARK. TIMES, (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.arktimes.com/
ArkansasBlog/archives/2016/03/17/judicial-campaign-contributions-and-a-change-to-
appointment-on-the-legislatures-agenda-soon. 
 4. Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of 
an Elected Judiciary, 46 HISTORIAN 337, 337 (1983). 
 5. Id. at 344–45. 
 6. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. VII, § 7. 
548 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
statehood in 1836.7 In 2000, the Judicial Article of the Arkansas Constitu-
tion was overhauled by Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution which 
provided, for the first time, the nonpartisan election of justices.8 
The biggest argument waged against popular elections then and now is 
that they force judicial candidates to become “politicians” with all that en-
tails.9 For example, they must campaign throughout the state and raise mon-
ey.10 There is also the impact of unidentified, dark money that has poured 
into the state in recent elections with scurrilous attack ads that have been 
patently false, but still have had the power of skewering election results.11 
As a final point, opponents of popular elections argue that justices are less 
inclined to make difficult decisions that might carry with them adverse polit-
ical ramifications if they must stand for a future election.12 
Proponents of popular elections, on the other hand, point to the educa-
tional value of traveling the state, both for the public and the candidates.13 
They further underscore various reforms that can minimize the “political” 
aspect, which are discussed in this article. Most importantly, proponents 
emphasize that from 1991 to 2012, weighty decisions concerning term limits 
for state and federal officials, sodomy laws, equal and adequate funding for 
public schools, adoption and fostering of children by same-sex couples, and 
the death-penalty were handled by the court without fear of political conse-
quences.14 
 
 7. David Ware, Official State Motto, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARK. HIST. & CULTURE, 
http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-detail.aspx?search=1&entryID=
3136 (last updated Nov. 26, 2015). 
 8. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX, §18. 
 9. Robert L. Brown, From Whence Cometh Our State Appellate Judges: Popular Elec-
tions Versus the Missouri Plan, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 313, 317 (1998) [hereinafter 
Popular Elections]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Alex Kotch, Conservatives Jockey to Tighten Grip on State Supreme Courts Across 
the South, FACING SOUTH, (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.facingsouth.org/2016/03/conservat
ives-jockey-to-tighten-grip-on-state-supr.html. 
 12. Alicia Bannon, Rethinking Judicial Selection in State Courts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR 
JUST. 12-13 (June 6, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/rethinking-judicial-
selection-state-courts. 
 13. Popular Elections, supra note 9, at 317. 
 14. See generally Robert L. Brown, A Judicial Retrospective: Significant Decisions by 
the Arkansas Supreme Court from 1991 Through 2011, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 219 
(2012). 
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II. MERIT SELECTION 
The common alternative to popular elections is known as merit selec-
tion,15 or the Missouri Plan, which came into vogue in 1940 with its adop-
tion by the State of Missouri.16 A nominating commission submits recom-
mended nominees to the governor, then he or she decides who the justice 
will be.17 Later, should that justice wish to serve for a full term, he or she 
must stand for retention in an election where the voters decide whether to 
retain that justice or not.18 The justice seeking retention faces no opponent, 
but the voters merely vote yes or no on retention for that individual.19 
The fifty states now vary considerably on the mode of selecting justic-
es, but by far the most preferred methods are the popular election and merit 
selection.20 Though there are many hybrids, approximately twenty-two states 
have popular elections, either partisan or nonpartisan, while twenty-two 
states have a type of merit selection.21 The remaining six states have selec-
tions by the governor or legislature.22 
The criticisms that have surfaced with merit selection are significant. 
There is first the lack of transparency that accompanies the final decisions 
by the nominating committee and ultimately by the governor.23 Who has 
their ears and who is influencing them? We do not know, as the final deci-
sions occur behind closed doors. 
Similar problems arise with retention elections that surface with popu-
lar elections.24 They are elections, which carry with them all the pitfalls of 
popular elections: campaign contributions, attack ads, unidentified dark 
money, lack of information about the judicial candidates, and so forth.25 
Furthermore, retention elections have appeared to render the judicial 
candidate even more susceptible to false ads mounted by third parties on 
highly sensitive issues such as the death penalty or same sex marriage.26 
 
 15. Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2 (1994). 
 16. Bannon, supra note 12, at 19. 
 17. MO. CONST. art. V, §§ 25(a) & (d). 
 18. Id. § 25(c)(1). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See TASK FORCE ON MAINTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON MAINTAINING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY 
13 (2016) [hereinafter Task Force II]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Popular Elections, supra note 9, at 321. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 317. 
 26. See Robert Lindsey, The Elections: The Story in Some Key States; Deukmejian and 
Cranston Win as 3 Judges Are Ousted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/
1986/11/06/us/elections-story-some-key-states-deukmejian-cranston-win-3-judges-are-
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This creates a significant problem because there is no identified opponent 
running the ad against whom the candidate seeking to be retained can mount 
a counterattack. 
Proponents of merit selection often point to what they perceive as a 
higher caliber of judge and one less political than one who is elected.27 This 
is debatable. No doubt, running for a supreme court position is a daunting 
undertaking and unsavory to many. Yet, over the past fifty years, Arkansas 
has boasted some of the best supreme court justices in the country.28 A 
prime example, in 2009, the Arkansas Supreme Court was ranked second in 
the country as the best state supreme court based on alacrity of decisions, 
frequency with which its decisions were cited by other state supreme courts, 
and absence of potential bias.29 Only the California Supreme Court was 
deemed superior.30 
Not only did Amendment 80 provide for the nonpartisan election of 
justices, Section 18 also included the option for the Arkansas General As-
sembly to refer the issue of implementing merit selection to a vote of the 
people at any general election.31 
In 2015, at the regular session of the Arkansas General Assembly, Rep-
resentative Matthew Shepherd filed a Joint Resolution to submit the merit 
selection issue to a vote of the people.32 The resolution failed to get out of 
committee before adjournment.33 
 
ousted.html (retention elections of Chief Justice Rose Bird and two associate justices for 
California Supreme Court); Colman McCarthy, Injustice Claims a Tennessee Judge, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 26, 1996), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1996/11/26/injust
ice-claims-a-tennessee-judge/f0a28c33-fcb1-4c1b-9471-2d5704d56a88/?utm_term=.59934f2
37f59 (Tennessee Supreme Court retention election of Associate Justice Penny White); A. G. 
Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html (Iowa Retention Election for 
Iowa Chief Justice and two associate justices, 2010). All justices were defeated for retention 
on issues like the death penalty or same-sex marriage. Id. 
 27. Popular Elections, supra note 9, at 322. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Infor-
mation Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L. REV. 1313, 1347 
(2009). 
 30. Id. 
 31. ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX, §18. 
 32. H.R.J. Res. 1005, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015). 
 33. See An Amendment to the Arkansas Constitution Concerning the Process for Select-
ing a Justice of the Supreme Court; and Amending Provisions Concerning Service on the 
Supreme Court ARK. ST. LEGISLATURE, http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2015/2015R/
Pages/BillInformation.aspx?measureno=HJR1005 (last visited Jan. 4, 2018). 
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III. TASK FORCE I (2011-2012) 
Because of the experience of other states throughout the country with 
their supreme court elections between 2006 and 2010, a clarion call was 
sounded in Arkansas about the perverse impact large campaign contribu-
tions, as well as unidentified, dark money, were having on judicial elections 
nationally.34 This was especially true in the wake of the Citizens United de-
cision in 2010, which permitted unlimited campaign contributions by corpo-
rations and labor unions as part of their free-speech rights.35 
Anticipating a similar deluge of outside money and false ads in judicial 
races in Arkansas, the Board of Governors of the Arkansas Bar Association 
approved a task force in December 2010 to investigate the money pouring 
into supreme court races in other states with false attack ads and report back 
with recommendations.36 An eighteen-person task force (Task Force I) was 
next appointed by Bar President Jim Julian in January 2011, chaired by the 
author of this article.37 The Arkansas Judicial Council also endorsed this 
mission.38 
Over the next year and a half, Task Force I held twelve meetings and 
heard multiple witnesses on a variety of reforms.39 Ultimately, a unanimous 
report was issued by the task force on June 5, 2012, which advocated three 
principal reforms under the umbrella of a 501(c)(3) corporation: 
A. Creation of a website to provide more information about candidates 
for the Arkansas Supreme Court.
40
 
B. A voluntary pledge to be offered to all candidates to sign where each 





 34. Robert L. Brown, Toxic Judicial Elections: A Proposed Remedy, ARK. LAW., Fall 
2009, at 13. 
 35. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010). 
 36. See TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN REFORM, REPORT BY THE TASK 
FORCE ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN REFORM 1 (2012) [hereinafter Task Force I]. 
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. Id. (members: Former Justice Robert L. Brown (Ret.) (Chair), Elizabeth Andreoli, 
Chuck Banks, Nate Coulter, Judge David F. Guthrie, Martha Hill, Henry Hodges, Jim Julian, 
Judge Alice Lightle, Judge Mary Spencer McGowan, H.T. Moore, Mark W. Nichols, Former 
Judge John F. Stroud, Jr., Former Justice Annabelle Imber Tuck, Judge Larry Vaught, Judge 
Joyce Williams Warren, Judge Ralph E. Wilson and Judge (now Justice) Shawn Womack). 
 39. Id. at 2. 
 40. Id. at 3. 
 41. Id. at 3-4; see also ARK. CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.1 cmt. 8 (2009) (amended 
2016) (alluding to unwarranted attacks by independent third parties on a candidate’s oppo-
nent which the candidate may disavow and request the third party to cease and desist). 
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In October 2012, the Board of Governors of the Arkansas Bar Associa-
tion adopted a motion complimenting the work of the task force.43 Two 
months later, the Board disbanded the task force.44 No further effort was 
made by the Bar to implement the reforms.45 The Judicial Council also ap-
proved of the work of the task force, but no additional steps were taken to 
put the reforms into motion.46 
IV. SUPREME COURT RACES IN 2014 AND 2016 
The prediction of a tsunami of dark money and attack ads proved pres-
cient. In the 2014 race for a supreme court seat between Judge Robin 
Wynne and Tim Cullen, unidentified money estimated by Tim Cullen at 
over $360,000 based on buys of television ads, streamed into Arkansas from 
an unknown group called the Law Enforcement Alliance of America.47 The 
television ads funded by this money attacked Tim Cullen for representing a 
pedophile and arguing that pedophilia was a victimless crime.48 Judge 
Wynne professed no knowledge of the source of the ad, but refused to disa-
vow it.49 He won the election.50 
At the end of 2015, former Justice Annabelle Tuck, a member of Task 
Force I, determined to take the reforms recommended by that Task Force in 
2012 “off the shelf” and activate them.51 A board was selected with Tuck as 
president, and a 501(c)(3) corporation created, dubbed the Arkansas Judicial 
 
 42. Task Force I, supra note 36, at 3. 
 43. Id. at 5-6. 
 44. Id. at 6. 
 45. Task Force II, supra note 20, at 2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Jacob Kauffman, Dark Money and Arkansas Judicial Elections, FM89.1 KUAR 
(May 15, 2014), http://ualrpublicradio.org/post/dark-money-and-arkansas-judicial-elections. 
 48. Max Brantley, The Best Justice Money Can Buy; Dark Money TV Ads Do It, ARK. 
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2015/10/29/the-
best-justice-money-can-buy-dark-money-tv-ads-do-it [hereinafter Best Justice]. 
 49. Max Brantley, The Stealth Attack in the Supreme Court Race Draws Response, ARK. 
TIMES (May 9, 2014), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2014/05/09/the-
stealth-attack-in-the-supreme-court-race-draws-response [hereinafter Stealth Attack]. 
 50. Best Justice, supra note 48. 
 51. Arkansas Judicial Campaign Conduct and Education Committee, Inc., New Non-
Profit to Battle Negative Judicial Campaigns, ARKANSASJUDGES.ORG (Jan. 20, 2016), http://
www.arkansasjudges.org/announcements/new-non-profit-to-battle-negative-judicial-campa
igns. 
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Campaign Conduct and Education Committee (AJCCEC).52 A Rapid Re-
sponse Team was appointed by the Board.53 
In 2016, attack ads were run against Justice Courtney Goodson in the 
amount of $622,000 by the Judicial Crisis Network and against Clark Mason 
in the amount of $400,000 by the Republican State Leadership Committee’s 
Judicial Fairness Initiative.54 The ad attacking Mason stated he was support-
ing President Obama, who was killing Arkansas jobs while making trial 
lawyers rich.55 The ads attacking Goodson spoke largely about the lavish 
gifts she had received.56 Judge Dan Kemp, who defeated Justice Goodson 
and is now Chief Justice, did not initially disavow the dark money ads that 
benefitted him on the basis that he believed the ads raised “legitimate ques-
tions about [Justice Goodson’s] publicly disclosed acceptance of lavish 
gifts.”57 Judge Shawn Womack, who ran against Clark Mason, did disavow 
the ads run against him.58 The Rapid Response Team issued a press release 
and letter on February 24, 2016, which demanded that the Republican State 
Leadership Committee cease and desist running ads against Mason on the 
basis that they were not true.59 The Committee, in its reply, refused to do 
 
 52. Id. (board of directors included: Ret. Justice Annabelle Tuck (President), Ret. Justice 
Robert Brown, Judge Mary McGowan, Mark Nichols, Nate Coulter, Jim Julian, H.T. Moore, 
and Beverly Morrow). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Andrew DeMillo, Outside Groups’ Spending Pays Off in Arkansas Court Races, 
WASH. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/2/outside-
groups-spending-pays-off-in-arkansas-court/; Kotch, supra note 11. 
 55. Benjamin Hardy, Out-of-State Organization Supports Womack, Attacking Mason in 
Associate Justice Race for Supreme Court, ARK. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2016), https://www.ark
times.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2016/02/20/out-of-state-organization-supporting-womack-
attacking-mason-in-associate-justice-race-for-supreme-court. 
 56. DeMillo, supra note 54. 
 57. Benjamin Hardy, Dark Money in State Supreme Court Race Funding Mailers, Web-
site Attacking Goodson, ARK. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.arktimes.com/
ArkansasBlog/archives/2016/02/11/dark-money-in-state-supreme-court-race-funding-mailers
-website-attacking-goodson.; Benjamin Hardy, Kemp Condemns Outside Ads Attacking his 
Opponent on Voter ID Issue in Supreme Court Race, ARK. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2016/02/18/kemp-condemns-outside-ads-
attacking-his-opponent-on-voter-id-issue-in-supreme-court-race. Kemp later issued a state-
ment rejecting the ads calling them “political gamesmanship.” Id. 
 58. Michael Wilkey, Arkansas Supreme Court Candidates Address Attack Ads, Judicial 
‘Integrity’, TALK BUS. & POL. (Feb. 26, 2016), https://talkbusiness.net/2016/02/arkansas-
supreme-court-candidates-address-attack-ads-judicial-integrity/. 
 59. Arkansas Judicial Campaign Conduct and Education Committee, Inc., AJCCEC 
Issues Cease and Desist Letter to Judicial Fairness Initiative, ARK.JUDGES.ORG (Feb. 24, 
2016), http://www.arkansasjudges.org/announcements/ajccec-cease-and-desist-letter-to-judic
ial-fairness-initiative. 
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so.60 The people or entities backing either the Judicial Crisis Network or the 
Republican State Leadership Committee were not named.61 
In short, dark money had a profound impact on the victories of Justice 
Robin Wynne in 2014 and Chief Justice Kemp and Justice Womack in 
2016.62 
V. TASK FORCE II (2016) 
Realizing that the forecasts of huge sums of money influencing judicial 
elections had come to pass in Arkansas, the House of Delegates of the Ar-
kansas Bar Association decided to take action.63 It requested President Eddie 
Walker to form a task force to explore the issues of merit selection, automat-
ic recusal of judges based on contributions, and dark money and other is-
sues, and then make recommendations.64 
A seventeen-person task force was formed (Task Force II), headed by 
Jon Comstock, and a report was made to the House of Delegates on June 1, 
2016.65 By a vote of eleven to six, the appointment process of merit selec-
tion was recommended over popular elections.66 Automatic recusal of judges 
based on a certain level of campaign contributions was rejected.67 Legisla-
tive reforms related to dark money were also endorsed to enhance transpar-
ency, if popular elections were retained.68 
Other recommendations were made that judicial candidates know who 
their contributors are and that candidates be required to file their campaign 
 
 60. Panel Brands Outside Group’s Flyer in Arkansas Supreme Court Race False, Times 
Record, (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.swtimes.com/news/state-news/panel-brands-outside-gro
up-s-flyer-arkansas-supreme-court-race-false. 
 61. Benjamin Hardy, In Supreme Court Race, $336,000 in Dark Money Advertising 
Fuels Attack on Goodson’s ‘Insider’ Connections, ARK. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.
arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2016/02/09/in-supreme-court-race-336000-in-dark-
money-advertising-fuels-attack-on-goodsons-insider-connections; Record TV Spending Nears 
$1.3 Million in Arkansas Supreme Court Race, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/record-tv-spending-nears-13-million-arkansas-
supreme-court-race. 
 62. Justin Miller, Judicial Spending Blitz in Arkansas Spurs Calls for Reform, AM. 
PROSPECT (Mar. 7, 2016), http://prospect.org/blog/checks/judicial-spending-blitz-arkansas-sp
urs-calls-reform. 
 63. See Task Force II, supra note 20, at 2-3. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (members: Jon Comstock (Chair), Associate Dean Theresa Beiner, Robert 
Cearley, Bob Estes, Judge David Guthrie, Scott Hardin, Paul Keith, Professor Mark Killen-
beck, Marie-Bernarde Miller, Brant Perkins, Troy Price, Brian Ratcliff, Representative Mat-
thew Shepherd, Judge Mary Spencer McGowan, Justin Tate, Guy Wade and David H. Wil-
liams.) 
 66. Id. at 6. 
 67. Id. at 4. 
 68. Id. at 11-12. 
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finance reports online.69 Further, should a judge or justice not recuse follow-
ing a motion to do so, it was recommended that an accelerated appeal to the 
Arkansas Supreme Court be available for the unsuccessful movant.70 
Task Force II, in its report, noted that the Arkansas Supreme Court it-
self, under the leadership of Justice Karen Baker, was conducting a review 
of the Judicial Code of Conduct and the rules of the Supreme Court Civil 
Practice Committee relating to recusal.71 A report following that review was 
issued on December 15, 2016.72 
II. DRAFTING TASK FORCE 
After the report of Task Force II on June 1, 2016, and vote by the 
House of Delegates, a Drafting Task Force was appointed by the President 
of the Arkansas Bar Association, Denise Hoggard, to produce a proposed 
Arkansas Constitutional Amendment for a single fourteen-year term for 
each justice after nomination by a nominating commission and appointment 
by the governor.73 That proposal was presented to the House of Delegates on 
December 16, 2016, but failed to get the necessary three-fourths vote for 
approval to be filed as a bar measure.74 
VII. LEGISLATION ON DARK MONEY TRANSPARENCY 
Arkansas House Representative Clarke Tucker filed his bill (H.B. 
1005) for the 2017 legislative session to require reporting and disclosure of 
the sources of dark money.75 While his previous efforts in 2015 were unsuc-
cessful, he believes he has done the necessary work with his fellow legisla-
tors to make the bill more understandable and palatable.76 
 
 69. Task Force II, supra note 20, at 11-12. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 17. 
 72. See In re Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, 2016 Ark. 470 (2016) (per curiam). 
 73. John Moritz, Vote Rejects Draft on Justice Selection: Bar Proposal Falls Short of 
Threshold, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE (Dec. 17, 2016), http://www.arkansasonline.com/
news/2016/dec/17/vote-rejects-draft-on-justice-selection/?f=news. 
 74. Id. 
 75. H.R. 1005, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2017). 
 76. Email exchange between Rep. Tucker and the author (Jan. 3, 2017) (on file with 
author). The bill has failed since the writing of this essay. See Max Brantley, Effort to Open 
Dark Money to Sunlight Defeated in Committee, ARK. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.
arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2017/03/08/effort-to-open-dark-money-to-sunlight-
defeated-in-committee. 
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VIII. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
To paraphrase Winston Churchill in a different context: The solution of 
popular elections may not be perfect but it is better than the alternatives.77 
The critical importance of the Arkansas people having a voice in who will 
judge them at the highest level cannot be minimized. Compare that to the 
very limited number of people who would participate in merit selection or 
selection of justices for a fixed term of years.78 Furthermore, even assuming 
the General Assembly voted to submit merit selection to a vote of the peo-
ple, it is highly unlikely that the voters would relinquish their right to choose 
their supreme court justices.79 
Popular elections, on the other hand, are still haunted by big money and 
its influence. There is, first, the ordinary contributions that flow into a judi-
cial candidate’s campaign from supporters.80 These are identified by the 
candidate’s filings in the Secretary of State’s Office.81 Beyond that, you 
have the relatively new reality of unknown money or dark money which 
poses a major challenge to the legitimacy of popular elections.82 Disguised 
money in unlimited amounts electing our supreme court justices should of-
fend everyone and needs to be corrected. Passage of legislation, like Repre-
sentative Tucker’s bill, that requires disclosure of these unknown contribu-
tions and contributors is of paramount importance.83 
Other reforms are also necessary. The reforms endorsed by Task Force 
I and II, which include voluntary pledges of judicial candidates to disavow 
false ads that could benefit them and rapid response teams to respond to 
those false ads, are in the early stages of implementation in Arkansas under 
the umbrella of a 501(c)(3) corporation.84 They need to have the full support 
of the Bar and every voter in this state. 
Further, reforms that the supreme court should entertain surround 
recusal. Kudos to the Arkansas Supreme Court for eliminating the Rule 3.3 
comment, for justices to not know their contributors, in the Per Curiam Or-
der handed down on December 16, 2016.85 Eliminating that charade is long 
overdue. But, the court should require all judicial candidates to publish their 
campaign contributions on a website close in time to their receipt, in addi-
 
 77. RICHARD M. LANGWORTH, CHURCHILL BY HIMSELF: THE DEFINITIVE COLLECTION OF 
QUOTATIONS 583 (2011). 
 78. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 1005, supra note 32. 
 79. How Should Judges Be Selected?, FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/justice/howshould/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2017), 
 80. See Ark. Code Ann. § 7-6-207 (Supp. 2017). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 83. See supra note 75. 
 84. See Task Force I, supra note 36; see also Task Force II, supra note 20. 
 85. See supra note 72. 
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tion to their filings with the Secretary of State’s Office. This could lead to 
legitimate motions to recuse based on those contributions where appropriate. 
An immediate appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, should a judge not 
recuse, is also desirable.86 
As a final point, merit selection is not the panacea that its proponents 
claim it is for the reasons already stated in this article.87 Additionally, wit-
ness appointments to the United States Supreme Court which most often 
reflect the political philosophy of the nominating President.88 Exceptions 
like Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice David Souter are very few in-
deed.89 Similarly, merit selection more than likely will reflect the political 
philosophy of the selecting governor.90 The same would be true of appoint-
ment by a governor of a justice for a fixed term of years. 
There are other disadvantages to appointing a justice for a fixed term. 
The single fourteen-year term, endorsed by the Comstock Drafting Commit-
tee, would be a first in this country if enacted and approved by a vote of the 
people.91 The fact that Arkansas would be first should not necessarily be an 
inhibitor by itself, but it highlights the fact that Arkansas does not have the 
experience from other states to guide it. 
It is obvious, though, that a single, fourteen-year stint would term-limit 
that justice and divest the Court of the institutional knowledge gained after 
only fourteen years of service. It would seem preferable to hold on to that 
experience and provide a future check, like re-election, that could lead to an 
additional term of service. 
Nonpartisan popular elections should govern Supreme Court selection 
in Arkansas. To discard this process because of dark money and dissatisfac-
tion with certain elections would be shortsighted. Reforms to popular elec-
tions are in the process of being implemented as well as curbs on the influ-
ence of dark money. The people should continue to determine who will de-
cide their cases at the highest level. 
 
 
 86. See Robert L. Brown, Judicial Recusal: It’s Time to Take Another Look Post-
Caperton, 38 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 63 (2015). 
 87. See discussion supra Part II. 
 88. Norman Dorsen, The Selection of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 4 INT’L J. OF CONST. 
L. 652, 655 (2006) 
 89. The Judgment on Justice Souter, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE (May 1, 2009), 
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 90. See Popular Elections, supra note 9, at 322. 
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